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INTRODUCTION

States, people, organizations, and economies are becoming increasingly
dependent on the Internet to conduct their everyday affairs. Despite this everincreasing cyber dependence, a small number of privately-owned submarine
cables—that are remarkably vulnerable to damage—are responsible for the
transmission of almost all internet communications.1 The criticality of these
cables, along with advances in submarine military technology, give rise to
the possibility that a state may attack the cables providing
telecommunications access to another state in order to deny that state,
businesses, and people access to the Internet. In the event that a state does
conduct such an attack on submarine cables, the victim state and
international community at large will need to urgently consider whether such
an attack constitutes an armed attack, which would justify the use of force in
self-defense, and, if so, what use of force in defense is legal.
Part II of this paper summarizes the criticality of the Internet to modern
society, while Part III describes the international submarine cable network
and its vulnerability. Part IV sets out the modern legal framework for
analyzing uses of force under international law. Part V analyzes whether an
attack on submarine cables would constitute an armed attack justifying the
use of force in self-defense, considering both attribution and the severity of
the consequences of the attack.2 Part VI discusses what uses of force in selfdefense would be appropriate then follows, with regard to necessity,
proportionality and the legitimacy of targets.
Part VII concludes that some attacks by states on submarine cables
could foreseeably amount to an armed attack that would justify the use of
force in self-defense. Such an attack will meet this threshold if it causes a
severe reduction in a state’s access to the Internet and other
telecommunications for a substantial period of time, which is highly-fact
specific. In addition, states exercising their right to self-defense must be
cautious of a range of factors that could render their use of force illegal. In
particular, they must be able to satisfy requirements of necessity,
proportionality and legitimacy of targets.

1. This paper focuses only on submarine communications cables and not submarine power cables.
2. This paper does not address the separate (and similarly pressing) issue of the legality of
wiretapping submarine cables. For a discussion of this (possibly already-realized) threat, see Tara
Davenport, Submarine Cables, Cybersecurity and International Law: An Intersectional Analysis, 24
CATH. U. J. L. & TECH. 57 (2015).
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II. THE CRITICALITY OF THE INTERNET AND SUBMARINE
CABLES
Since the invention of the World Wide Web in 1989,3 and particularly
since the mid-to-late 2000s, the Internet has revolutionized modern life. An
estimated 4.1 billion people now use the Internet, with the number of users
having grown by an average of ten percent each year since 2005.4 In
developed countries, 86.6% of people use the Internet, while 47.0% of
people in developing countries use the Internet.5 Demand for bandwidth is
predicted to increase almost twofold biennially for the foreseeable future.6
Despite the Internet’s crucial role in modern life, little attention is paid
to how communications are actually transmitted through the Internet7—that
is, not how internet service providers connect computers and smartphones to
the Internet through Wi-Fi and phone data plans, but rather how information
is thereafter communicated around the world.8 In fact, submarine cables—
not satellites—carry ninety-nine percent of the world’s international
telecommunications.9 The preeminence of cables is due to the fact that they
can transmit much more data at a much lower cost than satellites.10
Not only individuals rely on the Internet—businesses and states’
economies do, too. Globalization has caused the integration of states’
economies and their subsequent interdependence, with businesses using
email and international phone calls to communicate with overseas parties. In
international finance, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication uses the global submarine cable network for data
transmissions between financial institutions in over 200 countries and
territories.11 Those transmissions averaged 34.18 million per day in

3. History of the Web, WORLD WIDE WEB FOUND., https://webfoundation.org/about/vision/
history-of-the-web (last visited Dec. 12, 2019).
4. INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, MEASURING DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT: FACTS AND FIGURES 2019 1
(2019).
5. Id. at 2.
6. SUBMARINE TELECOMM. FORUM, INC., SUBMARINE TELECOMS INDUSTRY REPORT 19/20 15
(Stephen Nielsen ed.) (2019).
7. See Adam Satariano, How the Internet Travels Across Oceans, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/03/10/technology/internet-cables-oceans.html (“People think
that data is in the cloud, but it’s not,’ said Jayne Stowell, who oversees construction of Google’s undersea
cable projects. ‘It’s in the ocean.’”).
8. Id.
9. SUBMARINE TELECOMM. FORUM, INC., supra note 6, at 14. For a primer on the development of
the global submarine communications cable network, see Davenport, supra note 2, at 60–62.
10. See Submarine Cable Frequently Asked Questions, TELEGEOGRAPHY, https://www2.tele
geography.com/submarine-cable-faqs-frequently-asked-questions#Cable-101 (last visited Nov. 26,
2019) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions].
11. About Us, SWIFT, https://www.swift.com/about-us (last visited Dec. 12, 2019).
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September 2019 (bringing year-to-date growth to 7.5%).12 As Chief
Executive Eric Handa of APTelecom recently summarized, “[s]ubmarine
[c]able capacity for reasons of diversity in avoiding points of failure and
‘enabling always on’ networks is critical for banking and finance, aviation,
and various other industries that utilize cloud computing, artificial
intelligence, and are poised to seize on the upcoming 4th Industrial
Revolution of automation.”13
States also rely on submarine cables for their international
communications, including for national security, as the radiofrequency
circuits that satellites use have insufficient bandwidth for the operational
orders necessary for global military operations.14 Accordingly, states use the
cable network for military operations, diplomatic missions, and intelligencegathering.15 Although the United States has laid submarine cables solely for
national security purposes,16 this appears to be a novel concept.17 For
example, the lack of exclusively national security related submarine cables
between Egypt and Italy caused U.S. Air Force disruptions in 2008.18 Three
of the world’s largest submarine cables (between Egypt and Italy) were
damaged, causing a reduction in connectivity between Europe and the
Middle East of eighty percent.19 This disruption meant that the U.S. Air
Force could only launch tens of drone flights per day from Balad Air Base
in Iraq, instead of the usual hundreds.20
For the reasons stated in this section, the submarine cable network is
increasingly being labelled as “critical infrastructure”21—a classification that
reflects its profound significance to modern life.

12. SWIFT IN FIGURES Sept. 2019 YTD, SWIFT, https://www.swift.com/sites/default/files/
documents/sif_201909.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2019).
13. SUBMARINE TELECOMM. FORUM, INC., supra note 6, at 12.
14. Bryan Clark, Undersea Cables and the Future of Submarine Competition, 72 BULL. ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS 234, 235 (2016).
15. Id.
16. See Garrett Hinck, Evaluating the Russian Threat to Undersea Cables, LAWFARE (Mar. 5,
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/evaluating-russian-threat-undersea-cables (referring to
the Pentagon’s admission that it had laid a cable connecting Miami, Florida with Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
and was planning a second cable connecting Guantanamo Bay to Puerto Rico).
17. Rishi Sunak, UNDERSEA CABLES: INDISPENSABLE, INSECURE 8 (2017).
18. Id. at 21–22.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See generally, e.g., Doug Brake, SUBMARINE CABLES: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR
GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS (2019) (highlighting increased demand and use of submarine cables).
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III. THE VULNERABILITY OF SUBMARINE CABLES
Given the criticality of the submarine cable network, it is reasonable to
expect that submarine cables could be targeted for malicious purposes.
Despite their significance, however, they are highly vulnerable due to the
characteristics of the cable network and the cables themselves.22
Submarine cables generally have a girth similar to that of a garden hose
and are simply laid along the seabed (although they are typically buried
beneath the seabed close to shore).23 Their locations are easily accessible on
the Internet24 and they may be easily signposted close to land to caution
nearby vessels.25 Moreover, they are generally owned by consortia or private
companies,26 with the effect that states do not have the same direct
responsibility or ability to protect them than if they were publicly-owned.27
The fact that there is an average of 100 cable faults each year (i.e., more
than one quarter of all submarine cables)28 demonstrates submarine cables’
vulnerability to physical harm. Dragged anchors caused approximately twothirds of faults, with environmental events such as earthquakes also causing
damage.29 On rarer occasions, aquatic animals have caused damage, such as
by way of shark bites.30 Due to this vulnerability, then U.S. Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton listed dozens of cable landing sites around the world as
“critical foreign dependencies” in a confidential cable to all U.S. diplomatic
posts in 2009.31
Fixing cable faults is usually a lengthy and complicated process.32 The
owner of the damaged cable must first determine the location of the break
22. For an in-depth technical explanation of the vulnerability of the international submarine cable
network, see generally DNI, THREATS TO UNDERSEA CABLE COMMUNICATIONS (2017).
23. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10.
24. See, e.g., Submarine Cable Map, TELEGEOGRAPHY, https://www.submarinecablemap.com
(last visited Dec. 9, 2019).
25. This is the case in New Zealand, for example, where the Submarine Cables and Pipelines
Protection Act 1996, s 12 (N.Z.), has resulted in Orders in Council establishing signposted protected areas
surrounding coastal cable landing zones. The author has travelled to one such protected area off the Cook
Strait coast of Marlborough, New Zealand, himself.
26. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10. For a primer on the submarine cable industry,
see Davenport, supra note 2, at 65–66.
27. See, e.g., U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 114, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS] (mandating that states should impose liability for damage to cables during the
laying or repairing of other cables on the owners of those other cables). Brake, supra note 21, at 2.
28. Brake, supra note 21, at 2.
29. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10.
30. Id.
31. Request for Information: Critical Foreign Dependencies (Critical Infrastructure and Key
Resources
Located
Abroad),
WIKILEAKS: PUBLIC LIBRARY OF US DIPLOMACY,
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE15113_a.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2019).
32. Clark, supra note 14.
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using a built-in monitoring system.33 The owner must then contract cable
repair ships to attend the site of the damage.34 This can take a considerable
amount of time for long and remote cables—for example, the damage could
occur in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, thousands of miles away from the
nearest repair ship.35 For this reason, although cable faults in the populous
‘Transatlantic’ region are typically repaired within days or hours, the
worldwide average repair timeframe was approximately 27 days in 2019,
while the average for the much more expansive ‘Transpacific’ region was
longer than all other regions’ averages combined.36
The evolution of undersea warfare technology compounds the threat to
the submarine cable network. It is expected that unmanned underwater
vehicles (UUVs) will replace submarines for offensive missions in the 2020s
and early 2030s, given that they are smaller and more difficult to detect.37
The fact that use of a UUV does not directly threaten the life of an officer of
the offensive state will remove the direct risk to human life inherent to
offensive missions, along with the decrease in political capital that results
from the loss of patriotic life.38 Further, developments in undersea
communication methods are likely to allow submarines, UUVs and onshore
commanders to communicate without any above-the-surface vehicles or
facilities.39
In this context of improving autonomous access to cables, reporters
documented a significant increase in the activity of Russian submarines and
spy ships along submarine cable routes as early as October 2015.40 In
November 2019, Yantar—a Russian intelligence ship that has previously
been observed “loitering” around cables—was operating near North
America in the Atlantic Ocean in a manner that was invisible to open-source
tracking systems.41
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See SUBMARINE TELECOMM. FORUM, INC., supra note 6, at 51.
36. Id. at 49–51.
37. Clark, supra note 14, at 236.
38. See Teresa A. Myers & Andrew F. Hayes, Reframing the Casualties Hypothesis:
(Mis)Perceptions of Troop Loss and Public Opinion About War, 22 INT’L J. PUB. OP. RES. 256, 257–58
(2010) (“Wartime casualties reduce the legitimacy and political capital of state leaders across the
world . . . This lack of legitimacy can then lead to an inability for those leaders to maintain power.”).
39. See id.
40. David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Russian Ships Near Data Cables Are Too Close for U.S.
Comfort, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europe/russianpresence-near-undersea-cables-concerns-us.html.
41. H. I. Sutton, Russia’s Suspected Internet Cable Spy Ship Vanishes Off the Americas, FORBES
(Dec. 1, 2019, 7:50 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2019/11/19/russias-suspected-internetcable-spy-ship-vanishes-off-the-americas/#54da4e8f62c1; see also Hinck, supra note 16.

SHEPHERD_FINAL(DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

2/18/2021 11:42 AM

CUTTING SUBMARINE CABLES

205

IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK
This section introduces the sources of international law and their
hierarchy, before identifying treaty provisions and rules of international
customary law that set the framework for determining the legality of
responses to cable attacks.
A. Sources of International Law
The sources of international law and their order of primacy are codified
in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice of 1945.42
Those sources, in order, are: international conventions; international custom;
“the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;” and “judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of
law.”43 Although there is no principle of stare decisis in international law
(International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) judgments are not binding on
subsequent judgments or non-parties),44 the I.C.J. frequently references its
previous judgments to promote the consistency of its jurisprudence.45
B. Relevant Provisions of International Conventions
No international convention contains any direct provisions regarding an
attack against a submarine internet cable. Despite cable-related provisions in
the Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables46 and
United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea,47 neither convention provides
for the issue of the use of force in self-defense in response to a cable attack
by another state.48 The core relevant treaty is therefore the Charter of the
United Nations of 1945 (the U.N. Charter),49 which revised the law on the
use of force in response to World War II.50 To that end, Article 2(4) prohibits
the threat or use of force:
42. STAT. INT’L CT. OF JUST. art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031; 33 U.N.T.S. 993, available at
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute].
43. Id.
44. Id. at art. 59.
45. Gilbert Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators, 2 J. INT’L
DISP. SETTLEMENT 5, 9 (2011).
46. Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, Mar. 14, 1884, 24 Stat. 989.
47. See UNCLOS, supra note 27, arts. 51, 79, & 112–15.
48. Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, supra note 46, at art. 2; see
NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE STRATEGY AND LAW BRANCH RESEARCHERS, Strategic
Importance Of, And Dependence On, Undersea Cables 5 (2019); see also U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, supra note 27, art. 114.
49. U.N. Charter.
50. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 9–10 (4th ed. 2018).
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All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.51

Under Article 39, the U.N. Security Council has the sole right to
determine “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression.”52 The same provision gives the Security Council—whose
members include five permanent members holding veto power (the United
States, United Kingdom, People’s Republic of China, Russian Federation,
and France)—the power to decide what measures should be taken in
response to such threats, breaches or acts.53 However, because of the veto
power of the five permanent members, Article 39 often does not provide
states with satisfactory recourse.54 With the Russian Federation’s
aforementioned scoping of cables, it is foreseeable that a permanent member
would invoke their veto power in the event of determination of resolutions
following an attack on submarine cables. As such, Article 51 is relevant.
Despite the prohibition on the threat or use of force and the U.N. Security
Council’s sole authority to authorize responses, Article 51 allows a state to
use self-defense without prior approval in the event of an “armed attack”:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.55

Unfortunately, the drafters of the U.N. Charter did not define an “armed
attack.”56 The remainder of the U.N. Charter also provides no contextual
assistance, as there is no use of the phrase “armed attack” in any other
provision.57 One must therefore revert to the other sources of international
law, in accordance with Article 38 of the I.C.J. Statute.58 It is important to
note that although Article 38 of the I.C.J. Statute ranks international custom
51. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
52. U.N. Charter art. 39.
53. Id.
54. GRAY, supra note 50, at 20 (noting how the U.N. General Assembly—which is more
representative than the U.N. Security Council—has had to step in to condemn acts of aggression where
the U.N. Security Council has failed to pass a resolution because of the use, or threat of use, of a veto).
55. U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added).
56. See id.
57. See generally U.N. Charter (lacking the phrase “armed attack” in all but one provision).
58. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 42.
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and general legal principles higher than I.C.J. judgments and scholarship, it
is necessary nonetheless to consult the latter two sources to determine
international custom and general legal principles.
C. Relevant International Custom and General Legal Principles
The I.C.J. first considered the invocation of Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.).59 That case centered on allegations that the United States
executed an armed attack against Nicaragua by supporting the right-wing
Contras in their armed rebellion against the Government of Nicaragua.60 The
I.C.J. noted that the U.N. Charter “by no means covers the whole area of the
regulation of the use of force in international relations.”61 As Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter refers to the “inherent right of self-defense” and states that
it does not impede that right, the I.C.J. recognized that the right must be
customary in nature.62 Accordingly, the I.C.J. confirmed that Article 51
neither “subsumes” nor “supervenes” relevant international customary law
rules, such as those that self-defense only warrants measures that “are
proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it”63
The I.C.J. next considered the use of force in Oil Platforms (Iran v.
U.S.).64 The I.C.J. applied its judgment in Nicaragua, essentially determining
that the United States needed to prove four elements to justify the legality of
its retaliatory attacks: firstly, that it had been subject to attacks that Iran was
responsible for; secondly, that those attacks were of the gravest forms
constituting an armed attack; thirdly, that its response was necessary and
proportional; and finally, that the subjects of its response were legitimate
military targets.65 These elements can be referred to in short as attribution,
gravity, necessity and proportionality, and legitimacy. Attribution and
gravity are necessary to establish the right to use self-defense. In addition to
the right to use self-defense, necessity and proportionality and legitimacy are
required to establish the legality of self-defense as a response.
Having deduced the above four-element test for a legal use of force in
self-defense, it is necessary to consider the law in respect to each of those

59. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 24 (June 27); see also GRAY, supra note 50, at 125.
60. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 18, 20.
61. Id. at 94.
62. Id. (quoting U.N. Charter art. 51).
63. Id.
64. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 38–78 (Nov. 6).
65. Id. at 186–87.
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four elements and how it would apply in the context of a malicious attack on
submarine cables.
V. “ARMED ATTACK”?
If a state suffers suspicious damage to its submarine cable network, will
be to determine whether it has been subjected to an “armed attack” for the
purposes of Article 51. This inquiry encompasses the first two elements
above: attribution and gravity. If both elements are met, then the state can
turn to considerations of what use of force in response is justifiable.
A. Attribution
Attribution is the first hurdle in proving legal use of force in selfdefense,66 and states have often fallen on it. Essentially, a state wishing to
use force against another state in self-defense must be able to prove that the
alleged perpetrator did actually attack the cables.67 In the context of a cable
attack, a victim state would need to be able to prove two elements: firstly,
that the cable damage was a deliberate attack, and secondly, that the state it
wishes to retaliate against was responsible.
1. Deliberate Attack
The first element is significant because of the aforementioned
prolificacy of unintentional cable damage. Most orthodox uses of force, such
as a missile strike or armed invasion, are obviously deliberate. However,
while a state with several cables may be prone to assuming that a significant
outage is the result of a deliberate attack to its cable network, damage to
cables may have another cause, such as a dragged anchor or earthquake.68
Consequently, a victim state must be very cautious not to use force in selfdefense as a ‘knee-jerk’ reaction—particularly if it is one of the many wellconnected states whose cables converge at “chokepoints.”69 There are at least
ten such “chokepoints” worldwide;70 for example, all cables connecting
66. See id.
67. See id. at 189 (“The Court does not have to attribute responsibility for firing the missile that
struck the Sea Isle City, on the basis of a balance of evidence, either to Iran or to Iraq; if at the end of the
day the evidence available is insufficient to establish that the missile was fired by Iran, then the necessary
burden of proof has not been discharged by the United States.”).
68. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10.
69. See Doug Tsuruoka, How World War III Could Start: Cut the ‘Cable”, NAT’L INT.: THE BUZZ
(Jan. 7, 2018), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-world-war-iii-could-start-cut-the-cable23974 (“Chokepoints where cables converge because of underwater terrain or other factors are especially
vulnerable.”).
70. Michael Sechrist, New Threats, Old Technology: Vulnerabilities in Undersea Communications
Cable Network Management Systems 9 (Harv. Kennedy Sch., Belfer Ctr. for Sci. & Int’l Affs. Discussion
Paper No. 2012-03, 2012), https://citizenlab.org/cybernorms2012/sechrist.pdf.
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Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan converge in the Luzon Strait.71
Those countries suffered disrupted internet access when an earthquake
caused six cables to sever at once in 2006.72 Accordingly, a state that suffers
damage to its submarine cable connections must first establish that it actually
was the victim of an attack, rather than mere accidental cable damage from
other causes.
2. Establishing Responsibility
If a state is convinced that it is the victim of a cable attack, it must also
be able to attribute the attack to a particular state before it uses force in selfdefense. The I.C.J. considered responsibility in Oil Platforms and Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda).73
Oil Platforms centered on events in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and 1988.74
In 1987, a missile struck a U.S.-flagged oil tanker (Sea Isle City) near Kuwait
Harbor.75 The United States attributed the attack to Iran.76 Three days later,
U.S. naval forces destroyed two Iranian offshore oil platforms, asserting selfdefense.77 The next year, the U.S. warship USS Samuel B. Roberts struck a
mine in international waters off the coast of Bahrain.78 Again, the United
States attributed the attack to Iran.79 Four days later, the United States
destroyed two Iranian offshore oil platforms, again asserting self-defense.80
The United States alleged that those two attacks were part of an Iranian
campaign responsible for over 200 attacks on neutral shipping in the Persian
Gulf.81 Iran asserted that Iraq was actually responsible.82
The I.C.J. held that the United States provided insufficient evidence to
discharge its burden of proof for attribution,83 failing to prove that Iran was

71. Tsuruoka, supra note 69.
72. Id.; see also Asia Communications in Chaos After Earthquake Off Taiwan - Asia - Pacific International Herald Tribune, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/27/
world/asia/27iht-quake.4032404.html (reporting the Asian telecommunication chaos caused by an
earthquake in Taiwan which damaged undersea cables).
73. See Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. at 191–92; see also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 316 (Dec. 19).
74. Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. at 175–76.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 176.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 191–92.
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responsible for either the missile attack84 or the laying of the mine.85
Accordingly, the United States’ attacks on Iranian oil platforms were held to
be illegal.86
The I.C.J. considered attribution again two years later in Armed
Activities.87 The dispute in that case was Uganda was justified in using armed
force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (D.R.C.) during the Second
Congo War. Uganda claimed that it had acted in self-defense against crossborder attacks by the Allied Democratic Forces (A.D.F.), a Congolese
Islamist rebel group.88 The I.C.J. found that there was insufficient evidence
of D.R.C. support for the A.D.F. to hold the D.R.C. responsible for the crossborder attacks.89 Moreover, the D.R.C.’s inaction (or ineffective action) to
prevent the A.D.F.’s attacks could not amount to an “armed attack” by the
D.R.C.90
In light of these cases, it is crucial for a victim state to establish
responsibility for an attack to a particular state in order to justify using force
against that state in self-defense. This may well be difficult as the
development of UUVs and other covert seabed warfare technology
progresses. States would be wise to develop their detection capabilities in
order to mitigate the risk that the perpetrator of an attack would be
unidentifiable.
B. Gravity
Even if a victim state has sufficient evidence to attribute a malicious
attack to another state, that alone is insufficient for it to use force in selfdefense. After establishing attribution, a state must then prove that the attack
reaches the threshold of an “armed attack” under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter.
1. Previous Cases
In Nicaragua, the I.C.J. set an ambiguous test for subsequent
determinations of armed attacks, which established that not all uses of force
meet the threshold of an armed attack: “it will be necessary to distinguish the
most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack)

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 189.
Id. at 195–96.
Id. at 199.
Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. at 242. See Gray, supra note 50, at 140.
See GRAY, supra note 50, at 140.
See id.
See id.
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from other less grave forms.”91 In Armed Activities, the I.C.J. dismissed
Uganda’s argument that this ambiguous threshold of “armed attack” in
Nicaragua was too narrow.92 However, gravity did not play a controversial
role in either case.
In Oil Platforms, the I.C.J. considered whether all of the alleged uses of
force on U.S.-flagged or U.S.-owned vessels and aircraft in the Persian Gulf
would have amounted to an armed attack (had they had been attributable to
Iran).93 Regarding the missile strike on Sea Isle City, the I.C.J. determined
that, even cumulatively, there was insufficient severity to meet the threshold
of an armed attack for two reasons.94 Firstly, the missile could not have been
aimed precisely at the vessel, but only at the Kuwait Harbor generally.95
Secondly, an attack on a private vessel not flying a state’s flag could not be
interpreted as an attack on the flag-state.96 In relation to the USS Samuel B.
Roberts, the I.C.J. declined to determine whether mining a single military
vessel constituted an armed attack, but did not exclude the possibility that it
could.97
2. Application
The chief executive of international cable telecommunications
company Seacom, Byron Clatterbuck, is skeptical about the possibility of an
attack on cable causing a major outage.98 For example, the fact that the
United Kingdom is connected to more than 50 submarine cables means that
an attack would need to be executed simultaneously on multiple cables in
order to be effective.99 Clatterbuck’s point is strong for highly-connected
countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States (which is
connected to approximately 40 cables).100 The difficulty inherent in
sabotaging a sufficient number of cables to thwart telecommunications
service means that it is unlikely that such countries would ever suffer an
attack on their cables of sufficient severity to properly constitute an “armed
attack.” Additionally, submarine cables normally operate with reserve
91. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 191.
92. See GRAY, supra note 50, at 139.
93. Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. at 191.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 195.
98. James Griffiths, The Global Internet is Powered by Vast Undersea Cables. But They’re
Vulnerable, CNN (July 26, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/25/asia/internet-underseacables-intl-hnk/index.html.
99. Id.
100. See DOUGLAS R. BURNETT & LIONEL CARTER, INTERNATIONAL SUBMARINE CABLES AND
BIODIVERSITY OF AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION 4 (2017).
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capacity, so states with a multitude of cables (such as the United Kingdom)
would be able to simply increase the capacity of their remaining cables in
the event of an attack.101 Moreover, states with access to other cable systems
pursuant to mutual restoration agreements can access those in the event of a
cable fault. Moreover, states with access to other cable systems pursuant to
mutual restoration agreements can access those in the event of a cable
fault.102
However, Clatterbuck’s point is less applicable to smaller countries
with few submarine cable connections. For example, New Zealand is
connected to the outside world through five submarine cables, which all land
in or near Auckland.103 Only two submarine cables connect the South Island
to the smaller North Island (and consequently the rest of the world).104 It is
therefore foreseeable that an attack on even one of the submarine cables
connecting New Zealand would have a significant effect on its
telecommunications—particularly given that it also has no land borders and
therefore could not gain alternative telecommunications access through land
cables in an emergency.105 Furthermore, a coordinated attack on all of its
cables would be much more achievable, due to there being only five. The
same would be true for numerous other states—particularly those that are
small, remote and/or island states (for example, Kiribati is only connected to
one submarine cable)106 or those with aforementioned “chokepoints.”107
The effects of a near or total shutdown on a smaller, less well-connected
state could be catastrophic, with a shutdown lasting for several days or even
weeks.108 Although there have been some suspected intentional cable attacks
(by individuals), these mostly occurred in the 2000s.109 Given that usership
of the Internet is increasing at approximately ten percent annually,110 analysis
of the effects of the most recent government-enforced domestic internet
shutdowns provide more assistance in determining the grassroots gravity of
101. See SUNAK, supra note 17, at 21 (discussing the spare capacity to reroute cables between the
United States and United Kingdom in the event of an attack).
102. See Davenport, supra note 2, at 78 (discussing states that use the same network operating
center).
103. See Submarine Cable Map, supra note 24.
104. Id.
105. SUNAK, supra note 17, at 18.
106. Id.
107. Tsuruoka, supra note 69.
108. Key Actions to Protect Submarine Cables from Criminal Activity Identified at UNODC Global
Expert Meeting, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/
en/frontpage/2019/February/key-actions-to-protect-submarine-cables-from-criminal-activity-identifiedat-unodc-global-expert-meeting.html.
109. See Davenport, supra note 2, at 80–81.
110. INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, supra note 4.
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an internet shutdown. It is important to note, however, that these
consequences are only relevant to states that would have essentially no
access to the Internet if their cables were cut. Large states with vital servers
located there, such as the United States, would not be so affected, as internal
internet communications would still both function and have utility.111 As
such, a state such as the United States would likely have difficulty in proving
sufficient gravity in the absence of a widespread, coordinated attack.
3. Consequences of Internet Shutdowns
India is by far the world’s most frequent deployer of domestic internet
shutdowns, with approximately two-thirds of 2018 shutdowns occurring
there.112 In early August 2019, the Government of India shut down internet
and phone service in the then-state of Jammu and Kashmir for at least two
weeks.113 While Kashmiris were unable to access news media, both houses
of the Parliament of India passed the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation
Act, which demoted the state from full state status to two mere ‘union
territories’ (Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh).114 Although this denial of
civil and political rights is distinct to national security concerns, it
demonstrates the severity of what can be achieved while people are unable
to mobilize and communicate. In the context of an attack on submarine
cables, this example highlights the likelihood that a state would be unable to
effectively mobilize its military reservists and communicate any national
security threats to other parts of the country. This would be of grave concern
to any state experiencing a near or total internet shutdown.
Moreover, such a shutdown would have grave impacts for people.
Eleven days into the shutdown in Kashmir, The New York Times documented
that shopkeepers were running short on vital supplies, such as insulin and
baby food, as they usually ordered them online.115 The shutdown forced
banks and automated teller machines—which are reliant on the Internet for
all transactions—to close, causing shortages of cash (which Kashmiris no

111. See Louise Matsakis, What Would Really Happen If Russia Attacked Undersea Internet Cables,
WIRED (Jan. 5, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/russia-undersea-internet-cables/.
112. ACCESS NOW, THE STATE OF INTERNET SHUTDOWNS AROUND THE WORLD 2 (2019). For a
report on internet shutdowns in India, see generally SOFTWARE FREEDOM LAW CTR., INDIA, LIVING IN
DIGITAL DARKNESS: A HANDBOOK ON INTERNET SHUTDOWNS IN INDIA (2018).
113. See Vindu Goel et al., India Shut Down Kashmir’s Internet Access. Now, ‘We Cannot Do
Anything.’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/14/technology/indiakashmir-internet.html.
114. Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, No. 34, Acts of Parliament, 2019 §§ 3–4
(India).
115. Goel et al., supra note 113.
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doubt required to purchase necessary supplies while the shutdown rendered
card payment unavailable).116
In Zimbabwe, the government shut down the Internet for six days in
January 2019.117 The difficulty in making required payments and
communicating with business partners caused one fuel merchant, for
example, to lose his contract with a South African supplier.118 This meant
that he had to make 27 of his 35 workers redundant, close three of his four
branches and lose 90 percent of his monthly profits.119 People were unable
to purchase food without a functional electronic payment system.120
In Sudan, the military junta that assumed governance following the
2019 Sudanese coup d’état shut down the Internet for an entire month.121
Doctors were unable to order new medicine, causing a shortage of supplies
for treatment of diabetic patients.122 Meanwhile, protest leaders in the
Sudanese Revolution were unable to use WhatsApp to request medical
assistance.123
4. Analysis
In light of the above, a cable attack would have catastrophic effects on
a state that would endure a near or full internet shutdown for longer than a
few days. This fact is best stated by Robert Fonow, who summarized the
consequences that would ensue if a “chokepoint” cable landing site was
attacked:
[C]ascading failures could immobilize much of the international
telecommunications system and Internet for several weeks. The effect on
international finance, military logistics, medicine, commerce and
agriculture in a global economy would be profound. A degraded system
of military logistics would leave troops in the field with less support. The
international flow of oil and food supplies would be impeded. Chaos in
the shipping and airline industries would result. The system that supports
e-mail, Word and Excel file transfers would be gone. Electronic funds
transfers, credit card transactions and international bank reconciliations
would slow to a crawl. When apprised of this possibility, a senior official

116. Id.
117. Patrick Kingsley, Life in an Internet Shutdown: Crossing Borders for Email and Contraband
SIM Cards, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/02/world/africa/internetshutdown-economy.html.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id.
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of The Economist in London suggested that such an event would cause a
global depression.124

In this respect, the potentially catastrophic effects of a cable attack are
much graver than the effects of wiretapping submarine cables, which has
been perceived to not amount to an “armed attack” for the purposes of Article
51.125 The key difference is that wiretapping only compromises a state’s
privacy and creates a risk to national security, whereas a cable attack is an
actual attack on critical telecommunications infrastructure that has
immediate effects on a state, its people and its economy. Hence, a cable
attack is essentially the equivalent of a missile strike on other critical state
infrastructure, such as energy production plants, as opposed to intelligencegathering. It is notable that the authors of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the
International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations agreed that a cable attack
by a state would violate international customary law, whereas wiretapping
submarine cables is permissible.126
Despite the I.C.J.’s aforementioned note in Oil Platforms that there
could not be an armed attack on a private ship not displaying its flag, the fact
that submarine cables are privately-owned and not flagged to a state does not
defeat the potential for a cable attack to constitute an armed attack. A state
executing a cable attack would surely know exactly which state’s or states’
connections it was severing.127 Moreover, a strike on one private vessel is
more likely to be perceived as similar to a “cross-border skirmish” that does
not amount to an armed attack, due to its effect on only one ship; whereas a
cable attack is an attack on a state’s critical infrastructure and could affect
the entire victim state.
In light of the above, a cable attack will meet the gravity requirement if
it causes a severe reduction in a state’s access to the Internet and other
telecommunications for a substantial period of time. A bright-line test is
inappropriate, however, as circumstances will vary between attacks.

124. Robert Fonow, Cybersecurity Demands Physical Security, SIGNAL MAG. (Feb. 2006),
http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=cybersecurity-demands-physical-security.
125. See Davenport, supra note 2, at 101; Pete Barker, The Challenge of Defending Subsea Cables,
MAR. EXEC. (Mar. 20, 2018, 9:27 AM), https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/the-challengeof-defending-subsea-cables.
126. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 257
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017) (“The rules and principles of international law applicable to
submarine cables apply to submarine communication cables.”).
127. The locations and routes of submarine cables are publicly available. See Submarine Cable Map,
supra note 24.
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VI. LEGAL USE OF FORCE IN SELF-DEFENSE
A. Necessity & Proportionality
A state that suffers a sufficiently grave cable attack, that can be
attributed to another state, will need to quickly determine whether it is
necessary to use force in self-defense and what level of force is
proportionate. Although the I.C.J. treats necessity and proportionality
separately, they are considered together here because the concepts are, in
practice, entwined.128
Necessity can be defined as “the requirement that no alternative
response to an armed attack be possible.”129 Meanwhile, proportionality
relates “to the size, duration, and target” of the use of force in response.130
Christine Gray notes that there is consensus among scholars about some
principles regarding these requirements: “necessity and proportionality mean
that self-defense must not be retaliatory or punitive; the aim should be to halt
and repel an attack.”131 Nonetheless, “the defending state is [not] restricted
to the same weapons or the same numbers of armed forces as the attacking
state; nor is it necessarily limited to action on its own territory.”132
1. Previous Cases
Nonviolent aid will not justify the use of force. Despite finding that the
United States did have a right to use self-defense under Article 51, the I.C.J.
still considered necessity and proportionality in Nicaragua.133 Regarding
necessity, the I.C.J. held that U.S. force against Nicaragua was unnecessary
to protect the Government of El Salvador because the armed rebellion
against that government had already been defeated some months prior.134
Regarding proportionality, it determined that the United States’ response, in
mining and attacking Nicaraguan ports, was not proportionate to Nicaraguan
aid for El Salvadorian rebel groups.135 This case clearly establishes that the
use of force in response to nonviolent aid will not be a proportionate
response.136

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See GRAY, supra note 50, at 159.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 159–60.
Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 237.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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In Oil Platforms, the I.C.J. rejected the necessity of the United States’
targeting of oil platforms, as the United States had not complained to Iran of
military activities on the platforms (whereas it had complained of minelaying
and attacks on neutral shipping).137 The failure to raise the matter with Iran
in such a way “does not suggest that the targeting of the platforms was seen
as a necessary act.”138 The I.C.J. further considered that it was possible that
the United States’ response to the Sea Isle City attack was proportionate, but
its response to the USS Samuel B. Roberts striking a mine could not be
proportionate.139 That was because the mine did not sink the ship and did not
cause loss of life, whereas the United States’ response destroyed two Iranian
frigates and several other naval vessels and aircrafts.140
Armed Activities provides another example of a disproportionate
response to an armed attack. The I.C.J. observed that “the taking of airports
and towns many hundreds of kilometers from Uganda’s border would not
seem proportionate to the series of transborder attacks it claimed had given
rise to the right of self-defense, nor to be necessary to that end.”141
2. Application
Necessity could be challenging to satisfy in the event of a cable attack,
given the practical difficulty that a victim state could face in exhausting
diplomatic avenues when its means of international communication are
severely limited. Nevertheless, it would seem counterintuitive to allow an
aggressor state to claim that diplomatic avenues had not been exhausted, if
it was responsible for making those avenues impossible to exhaust in the first
place. It is therefore expected that the concept of necessity could be applied
with a practical bent in the case of a cable attack. Thus, in the event that
diplomatic communications are not possible, it is likely that it would be
permissible for a victim state to neutralize any naval vessels of the aggressor
state if they posed an imminent threat.
Separately, in light of the I.C.J.’s finding in Oil Platforms as to
disparaging human consequences of attacks, a victim state could encounter
difficulty regarding proportionality if its use of force caused unnecessary
loss of life. This is because, despite the criticality of the Internet to states,
their people, and economies, a cable attack alone (without other use of force)
would likely need to cause several weeks of non-connectivity for any loss of
life to occur.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. at 198.
Id.
Id. at 198–99.
Id.
Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. at 223.
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As such, states acting in self-defense must be aware of their duty to
exhaust all other avenues first (to the extent possible in the absence of
international telecommunications) and must be very cautious to avoid loss
of human life and disparaging damage to infrastructure.
B. A Bona Fide Military Target
In Oil Platforms, the legitimacy of the United States’ targeting of oil
platforms was at issue. The parties agreed that Iranian military personnel and
equipment were present on some of the platforms, but differed as to whether
Iran’s motive in arranging that was aggressive or defensive.142 The I.C.J. held
that the United States presented insufficient evidence to support its
contentions as to the significance of Iran’s military presence and activity on
the platforms.143
In light of reports of China and Iran using civilian vessels as quasi-naval
vessels in the South China Sea and Persian Gulf respectively,144 it is
foreseeable that an attack on submarine cables might be executed by nonnaval or unflagged ships. In this regard, a relevant principle is the I.C.J.’s
determination in Nicaragua that “‘the sending by or on behalf of a State of
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of
armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to’ (inter alia)
an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, ‘or its substantial
involvement therein’” can amount to an armed attack.145
Given the requirement that targets be bona fide military targets, it is
unlikely that it would be lawful to attack the aggressor state’s submarine
cables, as they are generally privately-owned and transmit primarily civilian
and commercial data. Even if the aggressor state owned the cables landing
there, that would not make them legitimate military targets in the same way
that other non-military, publicly owned assets, such as public hospitals,
would not be legitimate military targets. Moreover, cutting submarine cables
in retaliation would likely cause a loss of bandwidth in third-party countries,
too. It would also give the aggressor state an offsetting claim in any resulting
lawsuit for compensation in the I.C.J.
In conclusion, a victim state with the right to use force in self-defense
should target only military (or military-instructed) vessels or other
infrastructure capable of causing further or repeat damage to submarine
cables.

142.
143.
144.
145.

Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. at 161, 196–97.
Id. at 198.
See SUNAK, supra note 17, at 10.
Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 195.
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C. The Duty to Report
As a final note, it is important for states to comply with their Article 51
duty to report the use of force in self-defense to the U.N. Security Council.146
In Armed Activities, the I.C.J. “observe[d]” that Uganda did not report its
retaliatory actions in claimed self-defense to the U.N. Security Council.147
However, the “observation” has been interpreted as the I.C.J. clearly
implying that this was a factor indicating noncompliance with Article 51.148
Accordingly, victim states should practice care in reporting to the U.N.
Security Council as soon as they can transmit communications to their
diplomatic missions at the United Nations.
VII. CONCLUSION
Whether or not a state will be daring enough to execute a malicious
attack on the submarine cable system remains to be seen. Nevertheless,
states—particularly those with few cables or cable “chokepoints”—would
be prudent to prepare their defense strategies and legal justifications for the
unlikely event that such an attack occurs. This is of critical importance, with
people, economies and national security becoming ever-more dependent on
the Internet.
In order to use force in self-defense, a state that suffers from the effects
of a cable attack will firstly need to prove that the attack was an intentional
act of another state (as opposed to accidental or environmentally-caused
damage) and that the alleged state was, in fact, responsible. Secondly, the
cable attack must cause a severe reduction in the victim state’s access to the
Internet and other telecommunications for a substantial period of time.
Anything less would likely be a matter to be resolved through diplomatic
processes. Only if a victim state can establish these two elements will it be
able to prove that it has suffered an “armed attack” to which it can respond
with force in self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
Highly connected states, such as the United States and United
Kingdom, are unlikely to be able to meet this threshold unless they suffer a
truly severe attack. Pacific Island states, in comparison, will likely meet this
threshold in the event that one or a handful of cables are attacked.
If a victim state establishes the right to self-defense, it may only use
force if it is necessary and if it does so in a manner that is proportionate to
the attack(s) it has suffered. Victim states wishing to use force in self-defense
will need to exercise caution in not acting too hastily (so as to not have
146. U.N. Charter art. 51.
147. Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. at 222.
148. GRAY, supra note 50, at 129.
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exhausted all other options) nor too late (so as to have lost the necessity of
using force). They will also need to be careful to avoid human casualties,
given the likelihood that an initial cable attack will not cause casualties. The
victim state may also attack only legitimate military targets, which would
likely not include the aggressor state’s submarine cables.
As a final note, states considering engaging in cable attacks should be
cognizant of the likelihood that victim states will contend that such attacks
amount to an “armed attack” pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter—
even if they do not meet the threshold set out above.149

149. See, e.g., Request for Information: Critical Foreign Dependencies (Critical Infrastructure and
Key Resources Located Abroad), supra note 31 (indicating the seriousness with which the United States,
for example—a highly connected country—would likely consider an attack on its “critical
infrastructure”).

